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INTRODUCTION

To hear electric utilities tell the story, the end is nigh.1 Their chief
worry is symbolized by the simple rooftop solar panel. Of course, a
homeowner’s installation of rooftop solar, in and of itself, is little or no cause
for concern. After all, property owners have every legal right to generate
their own power. Rooftop solar, however, is significant for what it
* Joseph P. Tomain Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of
Law University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1.
See Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the
Electric Business Model, 25 ELECTRICITY J. Aug.–Sept. 2012, at 65, 66 [hereinafter Sioshansi,
Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business Model]; John Slocum, Threat from
Behind the Meter, The Case for Utilities to Compete Directly with Distributed Resources,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2013, at 46, 50.
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represents more broadly—distributed generation (“DG”).2 This broader
concept of DG means that central power stations can lose market share of
their electricity sales by a range of technologies including solar, wind, fuel
cells, micro-grids, and the like.3 Fortunately for electric utilities, at this
point, distributed solar electricity constitutes only one to two percent of the
total electricity load and, therefore, DG is not an immediately significant
contributor to load loss.4 However, the signs on the horizon are not
necessarily rosy for investor owned electric utilities (“IOUs”) that provide
seventy-five percent of the nation’s electricity.5
The reality is that the electricity market is changing.6 The market is
more competitive today than it has been historically and, consequently,
traditionally structured IOUs face real financial challenges as new
technologies with decreasing costs “directly threaten the centralized utility
model.”7 This article argues that the twenty-first century challenge to the

2.
Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business
Model, supra note 1, at 69. DG is also sometimes referred to as distributed energy
resources—or DER. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED GRID: REALIZING THE
FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 3 (2014), available at
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=3002002733.
3.
See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 2, at 10.
4.
Id.; see also CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES 22, 26
(2013) [hereinafter CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES], available at https://
ir.citi.com/HUpLUJZhzhXsP%2b6OiTTARHAGreyfPZR1UG279bla4pIcwvwwMBlSn6clve
Fs%2bcVQPTaKmIi568s%3d; PETER KIND, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADVOCATES,
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/
finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf (report prepared for the Edison Electric Institute).
5.
Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility Industry
Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/electricutility_
overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
The [United States] electric industry includes over 3,100 electric utilities. Investor
owned electric utilities are privately owned, represent [eight] percent of the total,
approximately [seventy-five] percent of utility generating capability, generation,
sales, and revenue. Historically, most investor owned electric utilities were
operating companies that provide basic services for the generation, transmission,
and distribution of electricity.

Id.
6.
See, e.g., Charles K. Ebinger & John P. Banks, The Electricity Revolution,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/11/06electricity-revolution-ebinger-banks.
7.
KIND, supra note 4, at 3; see also JOHN STERLING ET AL., NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TREATMENT OF SOLAR GENERATION IN ELECTRIC UTILITY
RESOURCE PLANNING 1, 4 (2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy1405ti/60047.pdf.
But see Julie Cart, Solar Power’s Outlook Not as Sunny; Projects Stall Amid Uncertainty
About the Future of Big Tax Breaks and Utilities’ Willingness to Buy the Pricier Electricity,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, at A1. Cart refers to utility scale solar in the article, which does
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electric industry is different in kind from previous challenges. Further, past
responses to past challenges are inadequate to meet the convergence of
demands posed on IOUs by new technologies, new markets, and new
regulations.8 Instead, the twenty-first century challenge requires a dramatic
new response as electric utilities face a new economic order and as they seek
revenue protection and assurances of financial stability from their regulators.
Now, what to do? Two responses are readily available. Electric
utilities can either fight or switch.9 The first response is the one given by
incumbents: Stay the course, tweak the regulatory system, and continue
doing business as usual (“BAU”).10 The BAU strategy relies on maintaining
cost-of-service ratemaking as central to the regulatory compact between
utilities and regulators.11 The second—and smarter—is that IOUs must
change their business models in significant—if not dramatic—ways.12 The
country is making a revolutionary transition to a clean energy economy13 and
not threaten traditional utilities as does distributed generation but does affect traditional
transmission. See id.
Of the 365 federal solar applications since 2009, just [twenty] plants are
on track to be built. Only three large-scale solar facilities have gone online, two in
California and one in Nevada. The first auction of public land for solar developers,
an event once highly anticipated by federal planners, failed to draw a single bid last
fall.

Id.
8.
Joseph P. Tomain, Building the iUtility, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2008, at
28, 29 [hereinafter Tomain, Building the iUtility].
9.
Michael T. Burr, Turning Energy Inside Out: Amory Lovins on Negawatts,
Renewables, and Neoclassical Markets, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2013, at 28, 31. Amory
Lovins expands on these two basic choices:
There are at least a half-dozen ways an incumbent can respond to such insurgents.
It can ignore them; fight them; try to tax or block them; finance them; buy them;
incorporate their products as its own brand[] offering; become an open-source
integrator for all qualified offerings; or several other possibilities. But among all
responses, playing ostrich [is not] a good one.

Id. Not surprisingly, incumbents tend to fight. See, e.g., Perry Sioshansi, Utility of the Future
or Future of the Utility?, BREAKING ENERGY (Nov. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM),
http://breakingenergy.com/2013/11/13/utility-of-the-future-or-future-of-the-utility/?print=1
(regarding California’s largest gas and electric utilities, “they were rather attached to the status
quo with all the protections, security, and restrictions that comes with operating as a regulated
monopoly”).
10.
Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business
Model, supra note 1, at 66.
11.
See id.
12.
See, e.g., Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29–30 (arguing
that electric utilities must change their business model from selling as much electricity as they
can to selling energy products and services including electricity generated from renewable
resources and selling energy efficiency).
13.
See BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, 2014 SUSTAINABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA: FACTBOOK 1 (2014), available at
http://www.bcse.org/factbook/pdfs/2014%20sustainable%20energy%20in%20America%20fa
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there are several drivers to that transition, including: (1) a developing policy
consensus;14 (2) positive economic indicators;15 (3) the need to diversify fuel
resources; (4) new financing techniques; and, (5) regulatory proposals at the
state and federal levels.16 Quite simply, electric utilities should behave as
key actors in that transition. Today, however, utility efforts have been
lacking as they seek solace in old ways of doing business.
This article will first explore current industry characteristics and
challenges in Part II. Part III will then discuss the current situation of the
electricity market and IOU participation in that market. Part IV will analyze
the fundamental legal claim available to utilities that the regulatory
environment is devaluing their property and may constitute a constitutional
taking. In Part V, a test case involving solar distributed generation and net
metering will be presented to examine the types of challenges facing IOUs as
well as available responses to those challenges.
Starting with Part VI, the article more broadly discusses the need to
change the current regulatory compact between utilities and their regulators.
Then, Part VII examines new forms of ratemaking that can be employed to
implement the regulatory compact. The article concludes in Part VIII with a
discussion of the shape that the utility of the future ought to take.
II.

INDUSTRY CHALLENGES

The electricity industry has been roiling for over three decades. For
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the industry continued to realize
growth and, with it, increasing sales and profits.17 Utility executives were
aided in their expansion by a cost-of-service rate formula that rewarded them
for their capital investments.18 During that period, as the industry expanded,
economies of scale were realized and consumers enjoyed relatively low and
stable prices while producers reaped their rewards.19
ctbook.pdf (“A revolution is transforming how the [United States] produces, delivers, and
consumes energy. The mix of supply is changing rapidly, with low-carbon sources gaining
share, while consumption is declining, despite overall economic growth.”).
14.
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 92 (2011) [hereinafter TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY].
15.
See, e.g., Joel Makower, The State of Green Business 2014,
GREENBIZ.COM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/01/21/state-greenbusiness-2014 (discussing growth in clean energy investments).
16.
CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 6.
17.
KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN
THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION 17 (2012),
available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/COSR_history_
final.pdf.
18.
See id.
19.
See id.
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By the mid-to-late 1960s, however, things began to change: A
national electricity infrastructure was completed; electric generation plants
reached a technological plateau; and, the cost of electricity from traditionally
structured electric plants began to rise.20 These events, among others, shook
the industry from its complacency and presented real challenges both to
industry actors and to their regulators.
This once staid industry began encountering a series of challenges
beginning in the late 1970s as electricity prices began to rise and as the
financial stability of the industry was threatened by two major events.21 The
first financial shockwave came with the collapse of commercial nuclear
power.22 From the mid-1970s through the 1980s, utilities that had invested
in nuclear power found themselves with excess capacity, canceled plants, or
the costly conversions of nuclear plants to coal-fired plants.23 These nuclear
investments ran into the billions of dollars and those costs had to be
apportioned in some way.24 The question “Who pays?” was a real one for
utilities, for regulators, and for consumers. The response to the question was
generally some form of cost allocation between ratepayers and
shareholders.25
In some instances, regulators simply amortized the
investment and allowed the utilities to recover their principal but did not
allow them to either earn a return on their investment or to recover their costs
of capital.26 In brief, the regulatory response to the nuclear crisis was to
20.
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 11 (1987)
[hereinafter TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION].
21.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in
Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 503 (1984).
22.
See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–04.
23.
MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–05.
24.
Pierce, supra note 21, at 504.
25.
See TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 3;
Pierce, supra note 21, at 505–06.
26.
See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
810 F.2d 1168, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this case, an en banc panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) ruling that allowed Jersey Central to recover a $397 million
investment in a failed nuclear power plant over a fifteen-year period. Id. at 1170–71, 1187–
88. Jersey Central wanted to place the unamortized portion that remained each year into the
rate base. FERC allowed the fifteen-year amortization—i.e., allowed the utility to recover
$26.4 million as an expense for fifteen years—but disallowed including the unamortized
portion in the rate base, and that ruling was upheld by the Circuit Court. Id. at 1171, 1187–88.
Regulators applied other rules as well. Some regulators, for example, applied the
prudent investment test, which held that investments that were prudent when made should be
recovered from ratepayers. See United Illuminating Co., 55 P.U.R. 4th 252, 267 (Conn. Dept.
Pub. Util. Control Aug. 22, 1983); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 45 P.U.R. 4th 386, 400 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n 1982). And others applied a used and useful test that held that ratepayers
were not to be saddled with the cost of an investment that produced no electricity. See
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protect some of a utility’s investment, and to maintain their financial stability
while not overburdening consumers.27
The second financial shockwave came in the 1990s with efforts to
deregulate the electric industry, and when that failed, then to restructure it.28
Complete deregulation failed due to its complexity and the inability to
develop either a policy or political consensus to fully deregulate.29 At the
wholesale level, deregulation looked promising and has occurred to a
significant degree.30 At the retail level, however, the continued natural
monopoly characteristics of the transmission and distribution (“T&D”)
segments prevented across-the-board deregulation from occurring.31 Many
states, however, did attempt retail competition,32 but California’s notable
failure threw two major utilities into financial distress with Pacific Gas and
Electric declaring bankruptcy.33 With that failed experiment, restructuring
effectively ended.34 Still, restructuring efforts threatened the financial
integrity of IOUs.35 The regulatory response to this problem, however, was
to provide some mechanism for utilities to recover any stranded costs that
resulted from (1) prudent investment and (2) reliance on regulatory
requirements.36
The nuclear power collapse and the failure of restructuring were oneoff events. In other words, once an investment in a nuclear plant was
unproductive for any of the reasons cited above, then the financially
threatening event was over and it needed to be resolved in some way.
Similarly, once an investment in a restructured environment was also seen to
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989). In this case, the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld a Pennsylvania state statute that mandated that only capital
investments that were used and useful could be recovered through rates. Id.
27.
See Pierce, supra note 21, at 518.
28.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 31.
29.
See id. at 36.
30.
See id. at 28, 31.
31.
See id. at 33; Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly
System, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 89, 104 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Joseph
P. Tomain, Whither Natural Monopoly? The Case of Electricity, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL
MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 111, 111
(Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003).
32.
See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 413 (2d ed. 2011).
33.
Laura M. Holson, California’s Largest Utility Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A1.
34.
Tomain & Cudahy, supra note 32, at 408.
35.
See Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility
Industry Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/
electricutility_overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
36.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6, 31.
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be unproductive, then it too needed resolution. The regulatory responses to
both events were essentially cost-based.37 Regulators looked to the prudence
of a utility’s capital investment and they looked to the overall effect of those
investments on the utility’s financial integrity.38 Regulators then did what
they could to ensure the continued financial existence of the utilities.39 The
current challenge, however, is not one-off. Instead, it is long-term and
developing slowly, and also requires a more creative response than shoring
up past investments.40 Instead, a forward-looking response is needed to
maintain a healthy electric market for IOUs.41
In order to better understand the nature of the twenty-first century
challenge, let’s briefly first look at changes in the market and then examine
some of the reasons for those changes. The electricity market in the twentyfirst century is dramatically different from what it was during the twentieth
century. For most of last century, electric utilities enjoyed a growing market
and, therefore, regularly enjoyed increasing sales. Today, however, things
are different.
Demand for electricity has slowed each decade from the post-World
War II golden age until now.42 In the decade of 1949 to 1959, electric
utilities enjoyed an annual growth of 9.8%.43 That growth has declined to an
annual rate of 0.7% in the first decade of the twenty-first century.44 In fact,
electricity demand has declined every year except two since 1996.45 Further,
for the last two years demand has fallen, and in 2012, demand was down
1.7% compared with 2011.46 According to recent Energy Information
37.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at viii–ix tbl.1, x,
17–40. In addition to nuclear power and restructuring, McDermott notes other periods of
stress including the rise of inflation during the 1970s, excess capacity in the 1980s, and a
current challenge to restore customer and investor confidence in the industry. Id.
38.
Id. at viii, 25–26.
39.
See id. at 33.
40.
See Ebinger & Banks, supra note 6.
41.
See id.
42.
See LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 151 (8th ed. 2005). From 1945 through 1965, electric utilities enjoyed
an annual growth rate of approximately seven percent. Id. “No doubt what helped most was
the dramatic and continuing drop in the real price of electricity, compared to the price of other
fuels.” Id.
43.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2040 71 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2013], available at www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf.
44.
Id.
45.
Amory B. Lovins, Amory’s Angle: Three Major Energy Trends to Watch,
SOLUTIONS J. ONLINE (Summer 2013), http://www.rmi.org/summer_2013_esj_amorys_
angle_three_major_energy_trends_main.
46.
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 2012 STATE OF THE MARKETS
REPORT 43 (2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/reports-analyses/st-
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Administration estimates, demand is scheduled to decline for the third year
in a row and hit the lowest level since 2001.47 Nevertheless, the Department
of Energy projects that for the next three decades, from 2011 to 2040, overall
demand will increase by twenty-eight percent.48 Even with such modest
growth in overall demand, individual consumers are, in fact, consuming less
electricity.49 More problematic for traditional IOUs, however, is that
projected demand for central power station electricity is predicted to fall
“dramatically due to a combination of energy efficiency and competition
from new technologies, which collectively could impact their addressable
markets by 50% over the next two decades.”50 To add to these troubles,
significant investment is needed in the electricity infrastructure, both to
upgrade the current grid and to promote interconnections with renewable
resources, as well as to make investments in new technologies.51
According to the Energy Information Administration, electricity
demand declined due to reduced retail sales and a lack of demand growth in
the commercial and industrial sectors as a result a soft economy.52 A slow
economy, though, is only one reason among many. Technological and
market reasons include increased energy efficiency in appliances and
buildings; smarter meters and temperature controls; smarter consumer
choices about using cheaper off-peak energy; growth of DG so that
consumers can obtain power on-site; and an increase of inexpensive shale
gas for home heating.53 These technological and market changes, however,
did not come about on their own. They were aided by state and federal
regulations that were intentionally designed to increase competition and
change the fuel mix in the electricity sector largely because cleaner, cheaper
mkt-ovr/2012-som-final.pdf; Jonathan Fahey, Home Electricity Use in US Falling to 2001
Levels, AP (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/home-electricity-use-usfalling-2001-levels.
47.
Fahey, supra note 46.
48.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra 43, at
71.
49.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 12 fig.1.5
(2012) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011], available at
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf. Energy consumption per capita has
been relatively flat or declining since roughly 1990. Id.
50.
JASON CHANNELL ET AL., CITI, ENERGY DARWINISM: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 73–75 (2013), available at https://www.citivelocity.com/citigps/
ReportSeries.action?recordId=21.
51.
See New Regulatory Frameworks for Electric Infrastructure Investment,
EDISON ELECTRIC INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/altreg_
brochure_final.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
52.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra
note 43, at 71.
53.
See KIND, supra note 4, at 3, 5, 11.
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power was available than that generated by IOUs.54 Further, these regulatory
demands clearly point to a clean energy future rather than to a continued
expansion of coal-fired—or even nuclear generated—electricity.55
III.

THE NEW NORMAL

The constrained electricity market now represents the new normal
for privately-owned electric utilities.56 This new normal must be recognized
as different in kind from the threats posed by the nuclear collapse and the
restructuring failure. Today’s challenge is structural, long-term, and driven
by multiple events. Consequently, to meet the challenge, structural changes
are necessary on the regulatory side to renegotiate the regulatory compact
and redesign traditional cost-of-service ratemaking.57 Additionally, there
must be structural changes in the business model of utilities as well. The
needed regulatory and business model responses presented by the new
54.
See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at ix–x, 33.
55.
Id. at 35. Recently, four nuclear reactors—two each in Georgia and South
Carolina—have been granted combined construction and operating licenses. See Building
New Nuclear Facilities, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/NewNuclear-Energy-Facilities/Building-New-Nuclear-Facilities (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
Nevertheless, the economics of high cost nuclear power remain problematic. See John
Mecklin, Introduction: U.S. Nuclear Exit?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (SPECIAL ISSUE), Mar.–
Apr. 2013, at 9, 9; The Cost of Nuclear Power: Numbers That Don’t Add Up, UNION
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-and-ourenergy-choices/nuclear-power-costs/ (last revised Oct. 1, 2013).
56.
See Ahmad Faruqui & Eric Shultz, Demand Growth and the New Normal,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2012, at 22, 23. Demand side management (“DSM”) is comprised of
“programs and technologies [that] enable consumers to reduce peak demand and electric
energy consumption by providing customers with incentives to buy more energy efficient
technologies and to shift demand from peak hours—where the power grid is stressed due to
high demand—to off-peak hours.” Id. at 24; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 1–2. Among the
factors contributing to the challenge, Kind lists: (1) falling cost of distributed generation; (2)
new technologies; (3) consumer and regulator interest in demand side management; (4)
declining natural gas prices; (5) slow economic growth; (6) rising electricity prices in some
sections of the country; and (7) investment need for system improvements. KIND, supra note
4, at 1–3.
57.
See, e.g., Jim Pierobon, Don’t Hold Your Breath for Any Progress
Stemming from the Joint Statement by NRDC and EEI, THEENEGERYCOLLECTIVE (Feb. 17,
2014), http://www.theenergycollective.com/jimpierobon/341816/don-t-hold-your-breath-anyprogress-stemming-joint-statement-nrdc-and-eei.
[W]e all have to realize that real progress can only be made by state utility
commissions, many of which seemed unwilling to seriously consider moving
beyond regulatory compacts in states that for decades have rewarded utilities only,
or mostly, for selling more kilowatt hours. Now that electricity demand nationally
is flattening and may be declining, the time has come for tradition-bound states to
reengineer the traditional regulatory compact.

Id.
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normal electricity market can be uncovered by first examining the economic
and policy assumptions behind the traditional regulatory model, and then by
examining the regulatory climate that has significantly contributed to the
current market.
A.

Traditional Economic Assumptions

In the early years of utility regulation, the relationship between
utility and regulator was based upon what—in 1898—the infamous Samuel
Insull proposed as “a grand bargain in which local electric companies would
receive exclusive franchise service territories, ‘…coupled with the conditions
of public control, requiring all charges for services fixed by public bodies to
be based on cost plus a reasonable profit.’”58 Nearly one hundred years later,
then Judge Kenneth Starr defined that grand bargain as a regulatory compact
that has been prevailing since electricity regulation began.59 In short, the
regulatory compact was indeed a grand bargain for the utility. As it turns
out, the regulatory compact also served as something of a bargain to
consumers and to regulators for most of last century.
Utilities greatly benefited from the regulatory compact essentially
because by having been granted an exclusive service territory, utilities could
block out competition from new entrants simply because they were now
operating under a government protected monopoly.60 Further, utilities also
benefitted from a ratemaking formula that operated like a cost-plus contract.
Utilities would receive all of their reasonably incurred expenses on a dollarfor-dollar basis and they would be able to earn a return on invested capital.61
58.
DAVID MALKIN & PAUL A. CENTOLELLA, RESULTS-BASED REGULATION: A
MODERN APPROACH TO MODERNIZE THE GRID 7 (2013), available at http://
www.gedigitalenergy.com/regulation/.
59.
See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC.
INST., supra note 17, at 56.
The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a
particular geographical areacoupled with state-conferred rights of eminent domain
or condemnationis granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive
regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free market. Each party to
the compact gets something in the bargain. As a general rule, utility investors are
provided a level of stability in earnings and value less likely to be attained in the
unregulated or moderately regulated sector; in turn, ratepayers are afforded universal,
non-discriminatory service and protection from monopolistic profits through political
control over an economic enterprise. Whether this regime is wise or not is, needless
to say, not before us.

Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 810 F.2d at 1189 (citation omitted).
60.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii; Electric
Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility Industry Overview, supra note 5.
61.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii, 2.
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While it is inaccurate to say that utilities were guaranteed a profit, in effect
though, as long as they operated prudently, profit was assured.62 Consumers
also benefitted to the extent that rates were set at more or less competitive
levels rather than at monopoly levels.63 Regulators benefited as well because
as the industry was expanding and as utilities were realizing economies of
scale, rates stayed relatively flat and in some instances, declined. In other
words, rate hearings followed well-established and well understood rules and
methodologies and the life of a regulator was fairly easy.64
The regulatory compact was implemented through the application of
a traditional cost-of-service ratemaking formula that required regulators to
balance the interests of the utility and its shareholders in earning a reasonable
return on their investments against the interests of ratepayers in not being
charged confiscatory or discriminatory rates.65 The balance was intended to
satisfy the Fifth Amendment constitutional prohibition against takings of
private property without just compensation.66
Cost-of-service ratemaking, quite simply, works well in an
expanding economy. As long as electric demand continues to grow and as
long as utilities continue to make technological improvements and achieve
scale economies, utilities can be rewarded for their prudent capital
investments and customers do not suffer rate increases due to a “virtuous
growth cycle in which increasing electricity consumption was viewed as
synonymous with the public good.”67
The danger in such a formula, however, should be apparent. As long
as utilities received a return on capital expenditures, they had an incentive to
build.68 Again, during a period of economic expansion and growth in
electricity demand, building is a necessary and economically valuable
strategy. Today, however, the industry is experiencing a “‘paradigm shift’
caused by the need for large new capital additions at a time of declining sales
growth and reduced credit worthiness.”69 If the economy slows or demand
falls, capital investments may not be economically valuable because the
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 6.
See id. at 6, 12.
See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATIONS 6 (1983); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 25.
65.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; J. GREGORY
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT:
THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 223
(1997).
66.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; SIDAK &
SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222.
67.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at ix.
68.
See id.
69.
Id. at 41.
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market is saturated and electricity sales flatten, meaning revenues decline for
IOUs. Today, IOUs in fact face just such a slow economy, weak demand,
and nervous regulators.70
B.

Traditional Policy Assumptions

Generally, energy policy—more specifically electricity policy—was
grounded on the central and important idea that the more energy that a
country produces and consumes, then the more vibrant its economy would
be.71 Indeed, the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented economic
growth for the United States as well as any developing country with a robust
energy infrastructure.
There are other policy ideas associated with this belief in the direct
positive relationship between energy and the economy. First, it is more
efficient to use cheaper inputs to produce a product such as electricity than
more expensive ones.72 In this way, then, the electric industry has relied
predominantly on cheap, but dirty, fossil fuels—particularly coal.73 Second,
scale economies could be realized through larger plants and greater
centralization.74 Therefore, the utility industry should capitalize on those
improvements—to a point. Parenthetically, this principle was exactly the
reason that utilities invested in nuclear power—to realize scale economies.
Unfortunately, that strategy often proved to be quite costly. Third, as utilities
moved from local to regional, and, ultimately, to interstate T&D, industry
regulation similarly moved from municipal to state and then to federal
authorities.75 In short, the development and the structure of the industry and
its regulation moved in tandem as industry actors and regulators mimicked
how each conducted its business, thus reinforcing the traditional energy
paradigm.76
As a result of these assumptions, the industry and its regulation
developed a pattern that exists today and is a pattern that has witnessed the
investment of trillions of dollars over the century. Unfortunately, the
traditionally structured industry and its regulation do not fit with current

70.
See id.
71.
See id. at ix, 17.
72.
TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 119.
73.
Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 358 (1990) [hereinafter Tomain, The Dominant Model of United
States Energy Policy].
74.
TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 11.
75.
Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, supra note
73, at 356–57.
76.
See id. at 374.
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economic policy nor are they aligned with contemporary energy policy
assumptions.
Most notably, today we have significant reasons to question the
underlying assumption about the direct relationship between energy and the
economy. Most particularly, even though electricity demand is projected to
increase overall, albeit slowly, individual consumption is declining.77 In
other words, the traditional belief in the direct linkage between energy and
the economy is now experiencing a reversal. Individual consumers can
continue to enjoy the lifestyles they have while consuming less electricity.
Further, industrial and commercial, as well as residential, consumers are less
dependent on the local utility for their electricity. Additionally, energy
policy—more specifically electricity policy—is concerned not only with the
relationship between energy and the economy; it is also concerned about
environmental consequences and about the energy reliability and national
security issues in the realm of geopolitics.78
Consequently, given the dramatic nature of changes in the electricity
market and in energy policy, it is time to reconsider, reevaluate and redesign
both the regulatory compact and the traditional approach to ratemaking—
particularly given the changes that have been made in energy regulation—to
which we now turn.
C.

Regulatory Changes

The regulatory landscape for the electricity industry and its markets
has been undergoing dramatic change for over forty years at both the federal
and state levels.79 It is this regulatory twist that has given IOUs cause for
concern and it is something that they must now confront.
Although, as noted above, the electric market began changing in the
mid-1960s, no major regulatory changes occurred until the passage of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).80 In brief, large
IOUs seemed to reach a technological plateau in the mid-1960s, yet they had
committed capital to expansion projects. In doing so, IOUs overbuilt and, as
a consequence of the traditional ratemaking formula, they were charging
customers for that capital expansion. To inside observers, it was clear that
cheaper electricity was available but could not get to market because T&D
77.
Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business
Model, supra note 1, at 65–66.
78.
See Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29.
79.
Compare e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012), with Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. §
2621).
80.
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.
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was privately owned by IOUs. As it turned out, PURPA proved the very
point that cheaper electricity was available.81
As economic dislocations occurred in world energy markets and in
the domestic economy, President Carter proposed, and Congress enacted, the
National Energy Act82 with the intent of stabilizing domestic energy policy
and markets.83 PURPA was intended to encourage states to move away from
electricity rate designs that encouraged consumption and move toward
marginal cost pricing because it would promote more accurate price signals
and achieve greater efficiencies.84
In addition, PURPA promoted
independent power production, co-generation and small power generation.85
Known as qualifying facilities (“QFs”), these non-utility generators were
able to produce electricity that was less expensive than electricity generated
from traditional IOUs and they were more successful than policymakers
imagined.86 QFs demonstrated that non-utility generation could be delivered
safely and reliably and, as it turned out, there were more generating facilities,
sometimes referred to as PURPA-machines, than anticipated.87
Consequently, it was revealed that cheaper power was available for electric
markets.88
QFs had a very attractive economic incentive to generate electricity
up to the maximum amount allowed under law.89 Not only could QFs
generate cheaper power for a firm’s own use, any excess power could be sold
back to the local utility at the “utility’s full avoided costs.”90 The local utility
81.
See Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2602).
82.
National Energy Act of 1978 was comprised of five major pieces of
energy legislation: Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978; Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3301); Energy
Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.); National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat.
3206 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 92).
83.
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92
Stat. 3206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8201).
84.
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3); Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2622).
85.
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210.
86.
See What is a Qualifying Facility?, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012).
87.
Id.; see Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L. J. 419, 423 (1995).
88.
See What is a Qualifying Facility?, supra note 86.
89.
Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Electric Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402,
417–18 (1983).
90.
Id. at 404.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/4

14

Tomain: Traditionally-Structured Electric Utilities in a Distributed Gene

2014]

UTILITIES IN A DISTRIBUTED GENERATION WORLD

487

had to allow access to QFs, and it was obligated to purchase their excess
electricity at the local utility’s marginal cost of electricity.91 The local utility
had to pay the cost that it would incur to generate one more kilowatt-hour of
electricity.92 In other words, the utility had to pay the generator not at the
prevailing market value, but at the utility’s own higher cost of producing
electricity.93 Thus, PURPA discovered a new generation market.
In effect, PURPA set the stage for competition. Traditionally
regulated IOUs, following the traditional regulatory structure and rate
formula, earned favorable rates, but they had overbuilt.94 The excess
capacity raised utilities’ fixed costs, which had to be recovered from
ratepayers.95 Consumers were aware of these market developments.96 They
did not want to pay for higher cost electricity and sought lower-cost
options.97 While the existence of lower cost electricity did not surprise large
customers, the market was surprised by how much new non-utility generated
electricity was available, and how eager new generators were to enter the
market. These new unregulated producers were willing to supply the market
with electricity at prices lower than those charged by incumbent IOUs, and
they now provide over one-third of the country’s electricity.98
PURPA opened electricity markets and other state and federal
legislation entered that arena and expanded competition.99 Under the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, Congress created a category of exempt wholesale
generators.100 These entities generated electricity to be sold at wholesale,
and they were exempt from some of the regulatory provisions contained in
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, which was later repealed

91.
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617, §
210(a), (d), 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3).
92.
See id. § 210(d).
93.
See id.
94.
Joseph P. Tomain, The iUtility, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY
PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 223, 231–33 (Alyson C. Flournoy &
David M. Driesen eds., 2010) [hereinafter Tomain, The iUtility].
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 231.
97.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at X; Tomain, The
iUtility, supra note 94, at 226–27.
98.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA
FOR DECEMBER 2013 tbl.ES1.B (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/
current-year/february2014.pdf.
99.
Cudahy, supra note 87, at 421, 423–24; see also Energy Efficiency &
Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Net Metering, GREEN POWER NETWORK http://
apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/netmetering.shtml (last updated May 25, 2011).
100.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79).
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by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.101 That repeal was deemed to be a
significant boost to independent power production because it opened the
electricity market to a wider variety of business activities.102 Also under the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress required electric utilities, under certain
restrictions, to offer net metering services to electricity consumers.103 To
date, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form
of net metering.104 Additionally, for over three decades federal tax incentives
in the form of production tax credits and investment tax credits, among
others, have spurred production of electricity from renewable resources.105
Finally, federal regulators, pursuant to enacted legislation, are pursuing
methods of pollution control.106 Proposed EPA rules will strengthen Clean
Air Act protections and they will have a negative impact on coal-fired power
plants.107
Federal regulation was a boon to independent power production.
State regulation, however, was more varied and went quite a bit further.
State regulatory actions that contribute to declining electricity demand
include demand side management planning requirements; integrated resource
planning requirements; renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”); and energy
efficiency standards as well as net metering laws.108 Additionally, in an
effort to stimulate non-fossil fuel generation, thirty-seven states and the
101.
See Michael J. Zimmer, Regulation Under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 2005, in 3 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 70.14 (2013).
102.
See id.
103.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 594
(codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)). “Each electric utility shall make available
upon request net metering service to any electric consumer that the electric utility serves.” Id.
The section contains qualifications that allow Public Utility Commissions (“PUCs”) to fashion
net metering rules: (1) consumer must be an “eligible on-site generating facility” and (2) that
electricity “may be used to offset electric energy provided by the electric utility to the electric
consumer during the applicable billing period.” Id.
104.
Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra
note 99.
105.
See Mona L. Hymel, Environmental Tax Policy in the United States: A
“Bit” of History, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 172 (2013); Mona L. Hymel, The United
States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax
Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 43, 50 (2006).
106.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–33 (2007) (holding that the
EPA does have the authority and the responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions).
107.
See, e.g., Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (forthcoming Federal Register Publication), http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposal.pdf (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014).
108.
See, e.g., Faruqui & Shultz, supra note 56, at 24–28.
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District of Columbia have adopted RPS that impose requirements of varying
strictness on local utilities to sell electricity generated by renewable
resources.109 These standards vary throughout the country but are comprised
of essentially two elements.110 First, a resource such as solar, wind,
hydropower, or geothermal must qualify for inclusion under the terms of the
RPS.111 Second, a percentage goal and timetable is established for each
utility to satisfy the requirement.112 RPS programs have a significant impact
on developing renewable resources over the last decade or so.113
States have also been involved in an array of other regulations that
are aimed at having electricity produced by non-utility generators using
renewable resources.114 Feed-in tariffs, for example, are long-term contracts
109.
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio
Standards, EIA (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have
Renewable Portfolio Standards], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850;
Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIREUSA.ORG (Mar. 2013), http://
www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf.
110.
See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107.
111.
See id.; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio
Standards, supra note 109.
112.
See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107; Lincoln L. Davies,
Commentary, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339,
1342 (2010).
113.
See Davies, supra note 112, at 1383; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most
States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 109. One of the open issues
regarding RPS requirements is whether or not they should be left to the states or that national
standard should be adopted. Compare Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable
Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1441–43 (2010) [hereinafter Rossi, The Limits of
a National Renewable Portfolio Standard], and Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy
Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 361–
64 [hereinafter Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable
Electricity Requirement], with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66. Because each state has a
different energy mix and because regions have different energy resources available to them,
the argument is made that they should be left to the states. Compare Rossi, The Limits of a
National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at 1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky
Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, supra note
113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66. However, national standards may
provide more uniformity and may make trading in renewable energy credits more fluid.
Compare Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at
1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable
Electricity Requirement, supra note 113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66.
114.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, ZERO NET ENERGY AND
THE DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE FUTURE: ADAPTING ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7, 9, 11, (2012) [hereinafter ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY
METERING], available at http:/ /www.rmi.org/Content/Files/RMI_PGE_NEM_ZNE_DER_
Adapting_Utility_Business_Models_for_the_21st__Century.pdf.pdf; U.S. Energy Info.
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that utilities enter into with renewable resource providers, which enable the
providers to have an assured income stream enabling them to provide
renewable energy.115 Energy efficiency standards and zero net building
standards are intended to reduce consumption by capturing energy
efficiencies.116 States also have tax credits available that have made the
installation of photo-voltaic (“PV”) solar and other alternatives more
affordable for more consumers.117
Consequently, an array of federal and state legislation has had two
dramatic consequences for the industry.118 First, competition in the
electricity market has been encouraged.119 Second, regulations have
promoted renewable resources and energy efficiency that have had the effect
of reducing demand for IOU electricity.120 This new regulatory scheme has
caused a reevaluation of regulation at both ends of the fuel cycle.121 At the
generation end, we have seen that the market is more competitive than once
assumed.122 At the consumption end, buyers wanted cheaper electricity.123
Since the late 1970s we have been trying to restructure the electric
industry with only partial success. We continue to struggle with the
problems of: (1) getting cheaper electricity to consumers; (2) continuing to
diversify generation sources; (3) dealing with intermittent sources such as
wind and solar power; (4) redesigning electricity markets; and (5)
encouraging traditional IOUs to rethink their business models. This last
issue—encouraging traditional IOUs to reformulate their business models—
raises a legal question of constitutional dimension. To the extent that a
privately owned firm has invested capital in reliance on government
regulations, is the firm entitled to compensation when those regulations
change? That question will be addressed in the next section and will then be
followed by the test case for the matter of DG that has been promoted

Admin., Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity
Technologies, EIA (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff],
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471.
115.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff, supra note 114.
116.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
11.
117.
See id. at 7, 9.
118.
Cudahy, supra note 87, at 423.
119.
Id.
120.
See CHANNELL ET. AL, supra note 50, at 74–75; Cudahy, supra note 87, at
423.
121.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21; Cudahy, supra
note 87, at 425.
122.
Cudahy, supra note 87, at 425.
123.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21.
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through government regulation and that now competes with the IOU market
share.
The electricity market is indeed changing. As the Edison Electric
Institute—the trade association for IOUs—puts the issue: “While every
market-driven business is subject to competitive forces, public policy
programs that provide for subsidized growth of competing technologies
and/or participant economic incentives do not provide a level playing field
upon which generators can compete fairly against new entrants.”124 It is
important to distinguish between technologically driven changes that result
in increased competition and competition that results from regulatory
requirements on incumbent utilities and on regulatory incentives that
promote new entrants. It is equally, if not more, important to realize that the
dividing line between markets and their regulation is fuzzy at best.125
Edison, thus, is partially correct to distinguish between marketdriven technological change and public policies that promote competition.
This distinction, though, fails to recognize that the electric industry has been
a regulated industry and has enjoyed the fruits of that regulation for over a
century. In other words, the divide between market changes and government
regulation is not a particularly neat one. The fact that the electric industry
has been the beneficiary of regulation and is now in a posture of contesting
competition that has come about through regulation reveals that a solution or
response to the industry’s concerns involves political as well as economic
considerations.
IV.

TAKINGS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES

As noted in Part II, the issue of costs from failed nuclear power
investments or from failed restructuring investments can also arise as
regulators adopt rules that increase competition for IOUs. Each of these
issues raises the same constitutional question. Is an IOU entitled to recover
such costs because of regulations that devalue its property? In other words,
has a regulation effectuated a taking of utility property?
Any legal transition generates economic winners and losers.126 In
the energy sector, subsidies and financial supports to wind and solar
providers, for example, reduce their cost of doing business and may open up
clean energy markets. Similarly, the under payment of royalties or tax
incentives and subsidies for fossil fuel companies reduce their cost of doing
124.
125.

KIND, supra note 4, at 4.
See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY:
THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 137 (2014).
126.
See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 509, 513–14 (1986).
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business, thus giving them a competitive advantage over clean energy
providers.127 In short, any regulation has economic consequences including
reducing the value of an owner’s property. It is generally true, though, that
regulations occur on a regular basis without giving rise to a takings claim.
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law.”128
However, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has also said, “[t]he
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a [constitutional]
taking.”129 Holmes’ Delphic pronouncement would seem to settle the matter
that a regulation can constitute a taking necessitating just compensation.130
However, the definition of a taking, let alone a regulatory or a deregulatory
taking,131 remains unsettled and takings jurisprudence has been seen by the
Supreme Court of the United States as essentially ad hoc.132 More
problematically, takings jurisprudence, as a whole, has been said to be in vast
disarray.133
Consequently, takings law is best understood on a case-by-case basis
with three or four general principles.134 First, a court is most likely to find a
taking when a property owner has suffered a permanent physical invasion of

127.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF FUELS AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-06-FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf
(while most energy resources receive some financial incentives “tax preferences for fossil
fuels continued to make up the bulk of all energy-related tax incentives through 2007,
typically accounting for more than two-thirds of the total cost”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE
EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION 24 (2013),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659801.pdf (undervaluing royalty payments on
public lands); David Kocieniewski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 2010, at A1 (“[A]n examination of the American tax code indicates that oil
production is among the most heavily subsidized businesses, with tax breaks available at
virtually every stage of the exploration and extraction process.”).
128.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
129.
Id. at 415.
130.
Id.
131.
See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222–26, 427. Regulatory
takings are discussed at 222–26. Deregulatory takings are discussed at chapter 13.
132.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
133.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One
Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012).
134.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982).
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his or her property.135 Second, a property owner who can demonstrate that a
regulation deprives him or her of all economically beneficial use of his or her
property may successfully assert a takings claim.136 Third, a regulatory
taking may be found when a regulation has frustrated the property owner’s
investment-backed expectations.137 These three reasons are the standard tests
developed by the Court for identifying takings.138 There appears, though,
that a fourth requirement is most often applied.139 Specifically, all of the
cases just cited deal with real property rather than with the value of a
corporate enterprise.140 Thus, “major regulatory initiatives rarely require a
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses.”141
Nevertheless, the takings argument is far from fanciful for utilities.
Indeed, the constitutional requirement that regulators cannot take property
without just compensation is at the heart of the regulatory compact. As
noted by the Supreme Court:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the
convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the
same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments [and] other business undertakings which are attended
by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no
constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in
highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return
should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under
efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its

135.
Id. at 441. The laying of cable TV lines across an owner’s property is a
physical occupation of real property and is, therefore, a taking. Id. at 421–26. “We affirm the
traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking.” Id. at 441.
136.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently
expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is,
to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

Id.
137.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (“The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.”).
138.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
139.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
140.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
141.
Epstein, supra note 133, at 101.
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credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper
discharge of its public duties.142

Over ninety years ago, then, the Supreme Court established the principle that
a public utility is entitled to earn a return on its prudently incurred capital
investments at a level sufficient for the utility to be financially sound and to
attract investors.143 The problem for a regulated entity, such as an electric
utility, is that regulations can affect the value of those investments.144
Indeed, electric utilities have raised the takings issue in a number of settings:
Environmental regulations,145 restructuring orders,146 low rates of return,147
and the like,148 have all generated takings claims. None, however, have
resulted in direct monetary damages paid in compensation to a utility
although financial relief from burdensome regulations has been made
available as discussed below.149
Substantive takings jurisprudence appears to provide electric utilities
grounds for claiming that when a regulation goes too far it then becomes a
taking.150 Yet, electric utilities’ regulatory takings claims have not been

142.
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W.
Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1923).
143.
Id.
144.
See id. at 689–90, 693.
145.
See, e.g., Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into
Procurement Policies, Rulemaking Proceeding No. 06-04-009, 2007 WL 2579525 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Sept. 6, 2007). The regulatory takings claim that GHG regulations may
devalue property or cause a sale of the property is denied. Id. Indeed, the PUC noted that
claimant failed to cite “any cases holding that there is a regulatory taking if a pollution control
requirement causes an owner of a plant to shut it down entirely.” Id.
146.
See, e.g., Provision of Elec. Servs., 175 P.U.R. 4th 1, Docket No. U-000094-165, 1966 WL 787623 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 26, 1996) (utility’s regulatory takings
claim that Arizona’s restructuring orders may result in uncompensated stranded costs denied,
because the rules provided a mechanism for at least some stranded cost recovery).
147.
See PacifiCorp, Case No. PAC-E-10-07, 2011 WL 1525191 (Idaho Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Apr. 18, 2011); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 P.U.R. 4th 401, Case No.
10-E-0050, 2011 WL 286478 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 24, 2011) (9.3% return on equity
not a taking even though it was below the rate set by other PUCs for similarly structured
utilities). PUC’s decision that the 27% of a transmission line that is not used and useful can
be excluded from the rate base is not a taking. PacifiCorp, supra note 147. The PUC also
noted that when the line is fully integrated into the system, it will put it into the rate base. Id.
148.
See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d 19, 23 (Vt. 2000) (takings
claim denied when the Public Services Board reduced the rate of return from 10.5% to 5.25%
because of the poor management of the utility).
149.
See id. at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of Elec. Servs., supra note 146;
Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, supra note
145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra note 147.
150.
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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successful.151 In part, the lack of success can be attributed to a narrow
application of takings doctrine as revealed by the four substantive law
principles listed above.152
In addition to a narrow reading of substantive takings law, utilities
must also confront procedural challenges to the successful assertion of a
takings claim.153 According to the letter of the law, if property is taken for
public use then compensation is required.154 However, compensation in the
form of damages for regulatory takings is rare if not impossible.155 First, if a
utility asserts that a regulatory taking has occurred as a result of an onerous
regulation, then the most likely remedy will be an invalidation of the
regulation, not damages.156 Second, courts are reluctant to award damages if
a utility asserts a facial claim of an unconstitutional regulation because, most
often, courts require a showing that actual damage has occurred.157
There is another subtlety to takings jurisprudence that electric
utilities must face. Regulation, for example, may very well reduce, even
destroy, a valuable portion of electric utility’s property.158 However, before
a takings claim can be successful, the property as a whole must be evaluated
and not just portion of it.159 A utility, for example, that argues that a portion
of its property was denied a return on investment, cannot successfully claim
that a portion of its property has been taken if, looking at the utility’s total
financial situation, the utility’s property still has value.160 Another way of
characterizing this issue of partial or full evaluation of a utility’s property is
to ask the question: How much damage has the utility suffered?
Utilities, for example, that have claimed that a portion of their
property has been excluded from rate base treatment and, therefore, denied a
return on investment, have not succeeded with their takings claim when the
151.
See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., supra note 147.
152.
See supra text accompanying notes 134–41.
153.
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005).
154.
Id. at 536–37.
155.
See, e.g., In re Citizens Util. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., supra note 147.
156.
See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 695 (1923).
157.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544; Customer Billing Arrangements, Case No.
99-M-0631, 2000 WL 33938296 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 19, 2000).
158.
See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989).
159.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
160.
See, e.g., Barasch, 488 U.S. at 301–02.
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remaining property is treated as a capital investment for which a return is
due.161 States that have passed legislation requiring that only property that is
used and useful can earn a return on investment have seen that legislation
upheld as constitutional.162 Finally, to the extent that the regulated entity can
take steps to mitigate any damages that might occur as a result of a
regulation, they must do so, and failure to do so will negate the takings
claim.
As the electricity market undergoes its current transformation and as
IOUs confront their current challenges, the issue of costs imposed on IOUs
due to government regulation is ever present as revealed by the test case next
discussed.163
V.

A DG TEST CASE

IOUs have become concerned about the growth of solar power,164
other renewables, and energy efficiency because of the consequent loss of
load attributed to those activities.165 The use of solar power is expanding for
three predominant reasons.166 First, the cost of solar panels is declining
noticeably.167 Second, third party financing options make the installation of
solar panels attractive to individual homeowners.168 And, third, existing state
161.
See, e.g., id.
162
See, e.g., id.
163.
See infra Part V.
164.
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3, 31.
165.
See id.
166.
See id.; Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://
www.solarcity.com/residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
167.
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3.
168.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114. Thirdparty financing essentially leases solar installations to individual homeowners or businesses
under long term-contracts but retains ownership. Id. at 23–24. The third parties also operate
the solar system. See, e.g., Solar Power for Your Home, supra note 166. These third-party
owners can do so because in exchange for selling solar installation, they receive tax credits
and other financial incentives as the nominal owner. See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET
ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 23–24.
The use of third-party financing and third-party ownership has not gone
unchallenged. See, e.g., Ruling on Petition for Judicial Review at 3–4, SZ Enter., LLC v.
Iowa Util. Bd., No. CVCV009166 (Iowa 5th Dist. Mar. 29, 2013). From the perspective of
the regulated utility, to the extent that third parties are financing a number of residential and
commercial installations, those actors are invading the service territories of the incumbent
utilities. See, e.g., id. at 18. The utility’s argument then, is that these third parties should be
regulated as public utilities. See, e.g., id. at 5. This matter is currently under consideration by
the Iowa Supreme Court. Appellate Court Case Details for SZ Enterprises v. Iowa Utilities
Board,
Docket
No.
13-0642,
IOWA
CT.
ONLINE
SEARCH,
https://
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and federal regulations provide financial incentives for solar installations.169
To an incumbent IOU, reduced electricity sales are a financial threat.
On December 3, 2013, the Arizona Corporation Commission issued
a ruling that brings together the several issues in this article.170 The Arizona
Public Service Company (“APS”), the local IOU, sought relief from
regulatory obligations and petitioned the Commission to reduce the burdens
imposed upon it by net metering regulations that required the utility to pay
rooftop solar users for their excess electricity.171
Arizona’s net metering law “allows electric utility customers to be
compensated for generating their own electric[ity] . . . from [identified]
renewable [behind-the-meter] resources,” such as solar power.172 “If [a]
customer’s energy production exceeds the energy supplied by the electric
utility during a billing period, [then] the customer’s bill for subsequent
periods is credited for the excess generation.”173 The credit is based upon the
IOU’s avoided cost or the customer’s retail rate.174 The avoided cost rate—
sometimes referred to as a bundled rate—means the marginal cost to the
utility of producing its next unit of electricity.175
To better understand the impact of avoided cost as defined by the
Supreme Court of the United States and in the Arizona Code, it is necessary
www.iowacourts.state.ia.us.ESAWebApp/AppelSimpFrame (search “Appellate Docket
Number” for “13-0642”; then follow “13-0642” hyperlink under the “Docket No.” column;
then follow “Docket” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
169.
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 31.
170.
See generally Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 121, Docket No. E01345A-13-0248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013).
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. The law does provide a safety valve and limits the size of the
customers distributed generation system to a maximum of 125% of that customer’s total load.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. This limitation is not unproblematic. From a utility
standpoint, this 125% maximum helps limit the amount of revenue loss. Regulators, mindful
of the need to protect the utility’s revenue requirement together with their service obligation,
have adopted such limitations. See generally SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, RATEMAKING,
SOLAR VALUE AND SOLAR NET ENERGY METERING—A PRIMER (2013), available at
http://www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51299/sepa-nem-report-0713-print.pdf.
The
problem, however, is that, to the extent that solar rooftop in particular or DG in general is
either a desirable or inevitable direction for the future of the electric industry, the transition is
being delayed. Id.
175.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 10. Arizona more
specifically defines avoided costs as “the incremental costs to an [e]lectric [u]tility for electric
energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the Net Metering Facility, such
utility would generate itself or purchase from another source.” ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-22302 (2013).
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to understand how a utility bill is designed. By way of simplification, a
utility serves basically three types, or classes, of customers—residential,
commercial, and industrial.176 Each class, in turn, has different energy needs
and is charged accordingly.177 By way of example, residential customers
consume less electricity than industrial customers; however, residential
customers, as a class, consume more customer service for their homes in
contrast with a large manufacturing company that requires less customer
service for its plant relative to the amount of electricity consumed.178
In the attempt to even out charges to each class of customers, a
utility bill is generally comprised of three components—a demand charge, an
energy or volumetric charge, and a customer service charge.179 The service
charge represents the costs, such as billing, metering and some investments,
to provide electricity service to each consumer.180 These charges remain flat
relative to the amount of electricity that a user consumes, but the total cost
varies with the number of customers.181 The energy charge represents the
amount of electricity consumed by each user.182 And, finally, the demand
charge represents the utility’s capital investment in plant and equipment that
is allocated to each consumer based on the consumer’s maximum rate of
usage.183 A rough way of differentiating these costs is to say that the energy
charge and the service charge represent a utility’s variable costs while the
demand charge represents the utility’s fixed costs. Usually, residential
consumers do not pay a separate demand charge.184 Instead, the fixed costs
are embedded in the volumetric portion of the bill.185 This embeddedness, or
bundling, gives rise to the problem litigated in this test case.186
In its regulatory filing, APS argues that as participation in DG
grows, it becomes increasingly concerned about the cross-subsidization
between customer classes.187 DG customers, APS argues, are partially
subsidized by non-DG customers because, it asserts, DG customers do not
176.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11.
177.
Id.
178.
See id. at 13.
179.
Id. at 15–17. PUCs often add other charges such as a surcharge for a
specific investment. Nonetheless, these three charges illustrate the distinction between fixed
and variable costs. See, e.g., id.
180.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3, 15.
181.
Id. at 15.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 17.
184.
Id. at 15.
185.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 15.
186.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
28–29.
187.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
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bear their fair share of fixed costs.188 Instead, they offload those costs to
non-DG customers.189 Parenthetically, in addition to an unfair allocation of
fixed costs, DG shows some income bias.190 Quite simply, higher income
consumers have more options available to them, including installing rooftop
solar, than lower income consumers.191 Consequently, rate designs that may
apportion costs across all residential consumers will be regressive and
unfairly burden low-income users.192
The issue of cross-subsidization is problematic.193 The real concerns
of APS, however, are that: (1) Arizona’s net metering obligations became
increasingly costly; (2) it was losing market share even though in its filing it
asserted that revenue loss was not part of its case; (3) that non-DG users are
paying a disproportionate share of the fixed costs; and, (4) most
disconcerting for the utility, the cost increase to non-DG customers will
effectively drive more people to DG thus resulting in greater revenue
losses.194 This phenomenon of losing customers to DG because of increased
costs is sometimes referred to as a death spiral, which is a
situation that prompts/forces more ratepayers to install solar on
their rooftop to avoid rising utility rates as a result of the spreading
out of those fixed costs to a lower base. In the end, the utility
could be left with fewer revenues to support already installed (and
future) infrastructure investments with long useful lives (i.e.
transformers, low and high-voltage transmission lines, distribution
assets).195

To gather information and formulate a proposal to the Commission,
APS held a series of conferences.196 APS then proposed solutions that fell
into two broad classes.197 To simplify, the first option for new DG

188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
See id.
191.
See id. (Burns, Comm’r, dissenting).
192.
See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING
(NEM): DRAFT COST-EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION 110–11 (2013); Sam Sciacca, Smart Grid
Dilemma: Concerned Stakeholders Seek an Equitable Cost-Benefit Ratio for All Ratepayers,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2013, at 32, 33–34.
193.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
30–31.
194.
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
195.
CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 11–
12; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model has been
stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”).
196.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
197.
Id.
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customers198 was that net metering could continue to be used; however, new
DG customers would have to pay under a rate schedule that better accounted
for the demand (or fixed) costs of the utility’s service through the imposition
of a “basic service charge, a demand charge, or a standby charge.”199 The
second option entailed a recalibration of the net metering rate.200 New DG
customers would be credited for the market value of the power that they sold
to the utility rather than at the avoided cost.201 Further, the rate at which DG
customers would be reimbursed would be recalibrated.202
APS recognized that by effectively lowering the current net metering
charge, rooftop solar installations may be slowed.203 To address that
problem, APS suggested that the Commission should authorize cash
payments to encourage greater DG penetration.204
Commission staff responded to APS proposals by noting that
Arizona’s net metering policy has been successful, that DG was expanding
as intended, and that it was following the net metering practices of the
majority of states.205 Staff acknowledged that DG customers effectively paid
less of the utility’s fixed costs, and therefore non-DG customers were
saddled with a portion of fixed costs higher than those actually used by
them.206 APS introduced testimony that this cross-subsidization amounted to
between $800 and $1,000 per year per DG customer.207 Consequently, those
costs had to be picked up either through higher rates or other charges such as
APS’s Lost Fixed Cost Recovery mechanism (“LFCR”).208
Staff argued that the APS analysis neglected to address the benefits
to the APS electric system derived from DG customers.209 The staff argued
that there were quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits attributable to
DG.210 The first quantifiable benefit is that APS will avoid paying certain
198.
Existing customers would be grandfathered into the rate schemes in
existence, for twenty years. Id. After that time, however, APS posed that the new rates would
be imposed. Id. The problem with this proposal, however, is that the rates should attach to
the property rather than to the customer. Id.
199.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 17.
207.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
208.
Id. The LFCR is a surcharge allowed by regulators that is intended to
offset the revenue that results from customers who reduce their bills through conservation and
other renewable energy programs. Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
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fuel costs and avoid making certain capital investments in plant transmission
or distribution.211 Non-quantifiable benefits include “increased grid security
and air quality improvements,”212 improved system reliability,213 load
balancing,214 improved forecasting and planning,215 environmental
improvement, and meeting regulatory requirements such as renewable
portfolio mandates.216 To be sure, accurately valuing the benefits of DG is
difficult and—according to one study—most analyses had failed to
comprehensively evaluate the benefits and costs of DG.217 Still, such
benefits may well be accounted for through a smart rate design.218 Not
surprisingly, intervenors representing solar interests, argued that APS should
award a system benefit credit to DG users for the contributions that they
make to the grid.219
Staff concluded that both options offered by APS should be rejected
and that the Commission should open a separate docket to more fully study
the issue, taking into account the benefits, as well as the costs, of DG.220 The
Commission, then, should develop a new rate design to account for DG
penetration.221
The Commission concluded that the proliferation of DG installations
did result in a cost shift from DG customers to non-DG residential
customers; therefore, rate design changes were warranted.222 As an interim
measure, the Commission imposed a seventy-cent per kilowatt monthly
211.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. Because distributed generation is
closer to its end users—sometimes located on exactly the same property—the need for
extensive transmission and distribution lines is mitigated. Id.
212.
Id.
213.
LENA HANSEN & VIRGINIA LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., A REVIEW OF
SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 37 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/
Knowledge-Center%2FLibrary%2F2013-13_eLabDERCostValue. System reliability can be
improved by distributed generation as it reduces congestion, reduces large-scale outages, and
can provide backup power during outages. Id.
214.
Id. at 15; see also ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra
note 114, at 32–33.
215.
See, e.g., Margaret Jolly et al., Capturing Distributed Benefits: Factoring
Customer-Owned Generation into Forecasting, Planning, and Operations, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Aug. 2012, at 32, 34–35.
216.
STERLING ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 7, at ix,
27–28; see also SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 25, 28.
217.
HANSEN & LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 213, at 4.
218.
Richard Perez et al., Why a Smart Fit Policy Is a Smart Policy, SOLAR
TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 18, 18, available at http://www.omagdigital.com/publication/
?i=145842&p=19.
219.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
220.
Id.
221.
See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11, 18.
222.
See id. at 20.
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charge for all residential DG customers until the Commission more fully
addressed the issues raised in the underlying proceeding.223 The goal of the
interim measure, then, is to not raise the amount of fixed costs APS collects
from residential non-DG customers due to reduced payments by DG
customers.224
The advantage of the seventy-cent fixed cost charge—also
sometimes referred to as an access fee, solar rider, or standby charge—is its
simplicity.225 New DG customers will know what the charge is and why it is
imposed.226 Further, such charges are intended “to recover a portion of the
utility fixed costs that have typically been embedded in volumetric
[electricity] rates.”227 In principle, this approach allows those fixed costs to
be fairly allocated among all customers, and specifically, DG customers.228
The test case raises exactly the correct issues and suggests a
direction for a correct solution as long as all benefits and costs are taken into
account.229 While the Arizona case is an important one to watch, a series of
studies and other actions are occurring throughout the industry and in many
states including California, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, New York, Texas,

223.
See MARK NEWTON LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C.,
ALTERNATIVE REGULATION FOR EVOLVING UTILITY CHALLENGES: AN UPDATED SURVEY 21–
23 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/
innovative_regulation_survey.pdf; CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra
note 4, at 19.
224.
See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 2–3, 20.
225.
See id. at 3.
226.
See id.
227.
Id.; see KYLE MACLAURY, CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T, ASSESSING
MINNESOTA’S SOLAR RESOURCE: REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR PV SYSTEM ORIENTATION
AND RATE STRUCTURE 4 (2011), available at http://www.mn.gov/commerce/energy/images/
SolarValueReport.pdf (noting that Minnesota has several rate designs to accommodate PV
generation).
228.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3.
229.
See CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at
11–12.
There is a middle ground solution on the compensation issue for DG, in
our view. Either: (1) a set fixed charge for T&D or (2) a credit that only reflects
the utilities replacement power cost of generation. Eventually, for DG to work at a
larger scale with the support of the utilities, we expect changes to the compensation
structure for the off grid solar providers in the near future. These changes more
specifically could include: (1) a bill credit that is lowered from the current
avoidance of full retail rates to one that resembles the utilities replace cost of power
(i.e. gas peaker) and/or (2) a demand charge (fixed charge for T&D) to be tacked on
to the off grid solar homeowners electric bills. These items provide a middle
ground solution, in our viewpoint, with net metering battles clearly evident in
several states like CA and AZ.

Id. at 12. See also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model
has been stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”).
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Vermont,230 Idaho,231 and others.232 In California, for example, legislation
was passed directing the California PUC to study the costs and benefits of
net metering and calculate the ratepayer impacts and cost of service to solar
customers.233
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, IOUs have been
experiencing increased competition from technological innovations as well
as from innovative regulatory strategies.234 On the positive side, the
electricity market is becoming more competitive; consumers are enjoying a
wider array of choices; and, energy policy is moving towards a clean energy
economy.235 Incumbents, however, must deal with the negative side of a
changing electric industry.236 More precisely, the challenge is to address the
matter of past investments made by incumbents.237 Now that consumers are
leaving the grid in whole or in part, which, if any, of the capital investments
should be recouped by IOUs?
Fortunately, DG penetration into electricity markets at this time in
history is relatively low and warnings about a death spiral for IOUs is
premature and alarmist.238 The amount of penetration by DG, at this time, is
minimal and manageable.239 A smart electric utility, like the smart
telecommunications firm, can get ahead of the technology and it can
certainly manage it to their advantage even if that necessitates changing the
230.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4; see also Herman K.
Trabish, Rooftop Solar and Net Metering Win a Big Decision in Colorado: Regulators Want a
Better Way to Value Solar, GREENTECHMEDIA (Jan. 30, 2014), http://greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/rooftop-solar-and-net-metering-win-a-big-decision-in-colorado.
231.
ID PUC Rules Against Idaho Power in “Net Metering” Case, SNAKE
RIVER ALLIANCE (July 3, 2013), http://snakeriveralliance.org/id-puc-rules-against-idahopower-in-net-metering-case/; see also Case Summary, PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://
www.puc.idaho.gov/fileroom/cases/summary/IPCE1227.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2014).
232.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4.
233.
Assemb. 327, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
234.
See Andrew Kosnaski & Ramesh Shankar, Embracing Disruption:
Developing a Leadership Role for Utilities in Alternative Technologies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan.
2014, at 16, 16.
235.
See id. at 20.
236.
Id. at 16.
237.
See id.
238.
See id.
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher
rates for those customers remaining—first creating a cross subsidy from wealthier
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives.

Kosnaki & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16.
239.
See BART KRISHANMOORTHY ET AL., SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, 2012
SEPA UTILITY SOLAR RANKINGS 6 fig.4 (2013), available at http://
www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51302/final-2012-top-10-report-v2.pdf.
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firm’s business model. But then, that is what smart businesses do. DG
penetration, however, is expanding and therefore caution is warranted.240
Regulators must provide a mechanism that compensates IOUs for their
investments and they must design a new regulatory regime for a clean energy
future. Additionally, regulators must insure that customers are treated fairly,
that cross-subsidization is minimized or justified on sound policy bases, and
that the proper balance between shareholder and ratepayers is realized.241 In
short, rates must respond to the legitimate concerns of the utility and to the
value provided by DG customers.242 Those responses will come from a
renegotiated regulatory compact, new rate designs, and new business models
for IOUs.243 Each of those issues is addressed in the following Parts.
VI.

THE NEW REGULATORY COMPACT

The core of the regulatory compact is that the government sets the
utility’s rates—and consequently, its profits—in exchange for protecting the
IOU’s service territory.244 As long as the IOU operates prudently, it is
virtually guaranteed a return on its capital investment. When the compact
was made, the exclusive business of the IOU was to sell as much electricity
as it could.245 As we have seen, the electric market is changing in significant
ways, such that a new regulatory compact must be considered.246
We can start with certain concrete assumptions. First, large-scale
central power stations will continue to be important generators in the
electricity market, although on a diminishing scale. Second, the T&D
segments of the industry will continue to be regulated as long as they exhibit
natural monopoly characteristics. Third, IOUs can no longer be devoted
240.
See, e.g., id. at 23.
241.
See Sciacca, supra note 192, at 33–34. The rate design issues that plague
rooftop solar and other DG strategies also complicate a utility’s smart grid investments. Id.
More specifically,
[d]o individual end users save enough money on their bills with AMI, for instance,
to offset the increase in rates necessary to pay for that infrastructure? If so, how
long does it take to achieve payback, or ROI? If the benefits [are not] direct and
quantifiable, then what reasoning in metrics justify such a project?

Id. at 33; see Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Patrick Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council,
EEI/NRDG Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp.
242.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 32.
243.
Id. at 36.
244.
Tomain, The iUtility, supra note 94, at 223, 231.
245.
See id.
246.
See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 5; Tomain,
The iUtility, supra note 94, at 234; Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the
Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL. L. 931, 933 (2009) [hereinafter Tomain, “Steel in the
Ground”].
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exclusively to electricity sales. Instead, IOUs must be seen as actors in a
broader energy business that provides a wider array of energy services and
products as discussed in Part III.247 Finally, because IOUs will continue to
be regulated, the regulatory compact will continue. However, given these
assumptions a new set of regulatory principles will be necessary and we can
identify five.
A.

Stranded Costs

First, utilities should not be put in a position of incurring excess
costs that, due to regulatory or policy changes, may become stranded and
may then give rise to a regulatory takings claim. This principle is actually a
two-edged sword. On the one hand, investors should not be deprived of a
return on their investments due to regulatory or policy changes.248 On the
other hand, regulators must be careful when imposing requirements on
IOUs.249 As discussed in Part I, regulators and legislators in the past have
provided relief to utilities from previous financial challenges.250 Thus, to the
extent that IOUs invest in reliance on regulatory requirements, then some
protection must be provided.251 Nevertheless, as contemporary energy policy
changes, the problem of stranded costs should be anticipated and, if possible,
avoided.252
The stranded cost problem in the context of an energy transition is
distinct from the problem of nuclear power cancellations and the like, and
from government ordered divestment. First, in the nuclear power and
divestment situations, the stranded costs were more or less identifiable and
occurred at a very time-specific point. 253 A clean energy transition is
distinguishable in that it will not occur at a point in time, but will most likely
occur over decades. This fact alone should allow utilities to plan for changes
in the industry and changes in their own business models. Next, as a utility’s
247.
See supra Part III.
248.
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29; see David B. Raskin, The
Regulatory Challenge of Distributed Generation, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 38, 47 (2013),
http://www.hblr.org/?p=3673. “[The] inability of utility shareholders to secure the return of,
and a competitive rate of return on, their investment gives rise to the condition known as
stranded investment or stranded costs.” SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29.
249.
See id.; Raskin, supra note 248, at 47.
250.
Raskin, supra note 248, at 47; see supra Part I.
251.
See Raskin, supra note 248, at 47. Raskin also writes: “The differential
was known as ‘stranded costs.’” Id.
252.
KIND, supra note 4, at 17–18. One suggestion for addressing the stranded
cost problem is to impose a stranded cost charge on all DER customers to recoup that portion
of the investment that might otherwise become stranded due to departures from the grid. Id. at
18.
253.
See id. at 8.
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customer base declines, the downward spiral in lost sales will mean that there
will be a smaller group of ratepayers to pick up increasing costs.254 That is a
scenario that is obviously not sustainable.
Nevertheless, although the law regarding regulatory or deregulatory
takings remains opaque, the risks are real.255 Investors will be reluctant to
invest without reasonable assurances of a return on their investment that will
not be negated by prudence hearings, regulatory changes, or legislation that
diminishes the value of their property to the point at which their investmentbacked expectations go uncompensated. Indeed, such financial risk is
reflected in the downward movement of credit ratings for the electric
industry.256 Thus, the issue of distributed generation, particularly coupled
with net metering, can pose a real risk to capital unless the utility recalibrates
the way it does business and regulators rethink their rules.257
B.

Legacy Financing

Second, regulators should avoid legacy financing. Quite simply,
traditionally structured utilities should not continue to be rewarded as they
have in the past. Any argument that utilities should continue to earn revenue
because demand is down must be scrutinized quite closely. Decreased
demand alone is no cause for continuing to allow a regulated firm to earn a
return on investment.258 The problem, of course, is complicated because the
current challenge to IOUs is the consequence of both market and
technological changes, as well as regulatory requirements. Nevertheless, no
utility has any legal claim to continue to maintain its revenue requirement
just because it loses sales.259 The idea that the revenue requirement must be
254.

See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16; Raskin, supra note 248, at

48.
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher
rates for those customers remainingfirst creating a cross subsidy from wealthier
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives.

Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16.
255.
Compare SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222, with Susan RoseAckerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1436–38
(2000).
256.
See KIND, supra note 4, at 10 fig.2.
257.
See Robert E. Curry, Jr., The Law of Unintended Consequences: The
Transition to Distributed Generation Calls for a New Regulatory Model, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Mar. 2013, at 44, 47. “As [distributed generation] grows, such under-recovery has the
potential to materially weaken the utility’s financial integrity and its ability to attract investor
capital, which in turn can lead to higher rates.” Id.
258.
See Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945).
259.
See id.
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maintained as embedded in a cost-of-service mentality to cover a utility’s
costs, regardless of the amount of service, is no longer tenable.
Cost-of-service ratemaking may have had its place; nevertheless, it
should not be used to allow utilities to continue to build dirty coal-fired
plants, nor should it be used to reward utilities for embarking on financially
risky nuclear projects precisely because “investment in conventional
generation [is] hard to justify” in the new market.260 Indeed, financial
analyses indicate that solar, wind, and natural gas generated electricity are
showing increasingly positive cost signals, particularly against nuclear
power.261 As a result, continued investments in coal and nuclear power will
be viewed skeptically by the market while investments in new fuels and
technologies are becoming increasingly attractive.262 Those investments
must also be viewed skeptically by regulators. Thus, instead of maintaining
the status quo, regulators must manage the changing role of IOUs and
encourage alterations in their business models.263
C.

Innovation & Competition

Third, the new regulatory compact should encourage—rather than
inhibit—competition and the development of innovative energy technologies
including sales reducing technologies such as DG. Indeed, the alternative
energy market is attracting significant investments and will only expand.264
DG is becoming an increasingly important actor in electricity
markets. In the test case, APS argued that it needed to revise net metering
rates in order to avoid unfair cross-subsidization.265 Behind that argument,
260.
CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73 (a report for Citi GPS).
261.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 EARLY
RELEASE
OVERVIEW
7,
11
fig.8,
12
fig.11
(2013),
available
at
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2014).pdf.
262.
See, e.g., id.
263.
See ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NEW BUSINESS
MODELS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: THE TRANSITION FROM VALUE CHAIN TO VALUE
CONSTELLATION 8 (2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/New_Business_Models.
264.
See JOEL MAKOWER, GREENBIZ GRP. & TRUCOST, STATE OF GREEN
BUSINESS 2014 58, 60 (2014), available at http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2014/01/
19/state-green-business-report-2014; CITI, CITI CLIMATE CHANGE UNIVERSE 3 (2013),
available
at
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/17389986/1546283763/name/CITI+Climate+
Change+Universe.pdf (projecting the need for $37 trillion in energy transformation over the
next twenty-two years, with $24 trillion of that amount devoted to clean energy including gas,
and $6 trillion in renewable power generation).
265.
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 12i, Docket No. E-01345A-130248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC.,
NET METERING BILL IMPACTS AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY SUBSIDIES: REPORT PREPARED FOR
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE 6–7 (2012), available at http://www.navigant.com/~/media/www/
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however, APS was concerned about loss of sales volume.266 To the extent
that net metering rates do generate an unfair cross-subsidization, then they
should be changed. However, net metering benefits must also be accounted
for,267 and to the extent that net metering rates may slow DG penetration and
therefore, act as a drag on innovation and competition, then that argument
should be rejected. The smart utility will become actively involved with DG
as well as with the development of utility-scale solar, wind, and other
renewable projects.268
D.

Universal Service & Reliability

Next, regulators must be attentive to maintaining universal electric
service. With the expansion of distributed generation and energy-efficient
improvements, some customers will be placed at a disadvantage such that
distributed generation and energy-efficient customers will be using less
electricity which puts pressure on utilities to raise rates to the customers that
remain in that territory. Similarly, regulators must assure energy/electricity
reliability. Electricity must remain available at the flip of a switch for most
consumers. To be sure, those consumers that have access to other sources of
electricity, such as distributed generation and the like, may be able to
negotiate for interruptible rates. Most consumers, however, will need firm
service contracts.
The provision of universal reliable service presents challenges all of
its own.269 However, an increase in electricity providers does have the
potential for bringing significant benefits to a utility’s T&D segments.270
Reduced load can, at times, reduce congestion and improve balancing, and a
larger number of providers should lower cyber security risks. To be sure, the
issue of reliability will be an argument to be made against DG and that

site/insights/Energy/Navigant%20Final%20Net%20Metering%20Impact%20Report_Revised
%20Dec%2011.ashx.
266.
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 265; NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC.,
supra note 265, at 7.
267.
See, e.g., R. THOMAS BEACH & PATRICK G. MCGUIRE, CROSSBORDER
ENERGY, EVALUATING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NET ENERGY METERING IN CALIFORNIA
19–20 (2013), available at http://www.votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
Crossborder-Energy-CA-Net-Metering-Cost-Benefit-Jan-2013-final.pdf.
268.
See, e.g., Brad Copithorne, 4 Utilities Thinking Beyond ‘Wires and Poles,’
GREENBIZ.COM (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/10/09/4-utilities-thinkbeyond-wires-poles.
269.
See Amory Lovins, Amory Lovins: Don’t Cry for the Electric Utilities,
GREENBIZ.COM (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/02/12/dont-lamentrenewables-disruption-electric-utilities.
270.
See id.
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argument should be recognized for what it is—a political argument not
necessarily a technical nor economic one.271
E.

Mitigation

The Arizona test case, and others like it, as well as the reports of the
dire threats to electric utilities, clearly demonstrate that IOUs are well aware
of changing electricity market conditions as well as aware of a change in the
policy landscape towards clean energy. As a consequence, utilities cannot
rely on past practices for future revenue. Instead, since IOUs are well aware
of the political economy of a changing energy market, they cannot continue
to do business as usual; to the extent that they can avoid incurring
expenditures based upon past assumptions, they must do so in an effort to
mitigate damages as is required by any contract.
During the period of electric industry restructuring, for example,
New Hampshire passed legislation intended to introduce competition into
retail electric markets.272 As part of those efforts, independent system
operators controlled the transmission grid by accepting bilateral contracts
and operating a power exchange with spot markets.273 The New Hampshire
restructuring plan would treat generation and retail marketing as functionally
separate from T&D services.274 The legislation expressed a preference for
the divestiture of a utility’s generation and transportation assets.275 Utilities
operating under the previous statutory scheme were concerned about
stranded assets.276 More specifically, regulators recognized the fact that if
retail customers could purchase lower-priced electricity from sources other
than the IOU, then a portion of the IOU’s investments may be
unrecoverable.277
The New Hampshire PUC recognized this possibility and made
provisions that would allow the utility to recover its stranded costs if those
costs were found to have resulted from a government regulation.278 The
utility, however, would not be able to recover stranded costs if they were
imprudently incurred.279 Concomitantly, the legislation required utilities to
271.
See id.
272.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374-F:1 (2013); Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util.
Indus., 171 P.U.R. 4th 564, DR 96-150, 1996 WL 591937 (N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 10,
1996).
273.
See Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272.
274.
Id.
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272.
279.
Id.
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mitigate their stranded costs.280 Moreover, the commission took a fairly
aggressive approach regarding mitigation efforts that the utility should
undertake.281 Those steps included, among other efforts, “the sale of . . .
excess generating capacity” and the renegotiation of service contracts.282
By adopting these principles, then, the regulatory compact will
continue to balance utility/shareholder interests with customer/ratepayer
interests while maintaining reasonable and fair rates. At the same time, the
new regulatory compact will encourage utilities to adopt new business
models; promote technological innovation and competition; expand market
opportunities; and, increase consumer choice. The regulatory compact,
however, is not self-executing. Instead, PUCs must adopt a forward-looking
approach to ratemaking.
VII.

RATEMAKING

Ratemaking is the mechanism that drives the regulatory compact.
Historically, cost-of-service ratemaking has had remarkable persistence even
though regulators have been experimenting with performance-based rates
and with market-based rates for decades.283 As noted earlier, when the
electric industry was challenged by nuclear and restructuring failures,
regulators relied on cost-based ratemaking.284 In times of financial stress,
when utilities confronted volatile costs for fuel or wrestled with inflation,
they sought refuge behind automatic fuel adjustment clauses that allowed
rates to escalate in tandem with those rising costs.285 Similarly, regulators
have relied on this formula and, in some instances, have expanded its use.286
Such devices as forward test years,287 multi-year rate structures,288 cost
trackers, and the like, are all cost-based.289

280.
Id.
281.
Id.
282.
Id.
283.
See, e.g., SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE:
THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND JURISDICTION 216 (2013).
284.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 18–19.
285.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5 (a
report for the Edison Electric Institute on cost trackers); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST.,
supra note 17, at 18–19 (fuel adjustment mechanisms). Another mechanism for recovering
costs during construction periods is to include construction costs while they are ongoing.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5. This mechanism is
known as construction work in progress. Id.
286.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 23.
287.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 27.
288.
Id. at 31.
289.
See id. at 5, 27, 31.
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In brief, cost-based ratemaking functions well when the market is
expanding and demand continues to grow. Once the market slows or stalls,
then cost-based ratemaking may contribute to excess capacity and other
economic dislocations.290 Further, “cost of service regulation can slow the
pace of innovation and may offer little incentive for utilities to improve
operational efficiency or service quality beyond the minimum levels set by
regulators.”291
Nevertheless, cost-of-service ratemaking has a strong hold on the
regulatory structure. “The regulatory framework has been resilient in the
face of the flux brought about by economic, technical, and financial shocks
that often nullified one or more of the assumptions underlying the original
framework, precisely because of the willingness to adopt incremental
changes to the process.”292 However, another way of analyzing cost-of
service ratemaking is to argue that it has not been resistant to change and that
the ratemaking formula must adapt to today’s changing market conditions.
The most immediate problem, then, is that cost-of-service
ratemaking was dedicated to covering a utility’s prudently incurred costs.
Now the problem is that utilities cannot continue to make the same types of
investments that they have in the past particularly in light of falling sales that
can threaten a utility’s of financial stability.293 In brief, the traditionally
structured electric utility, as well as its regulators, must figure out how to
earn money by selling less electricity while promoting other energy services
and products.
Fortunately, there is no shortage of new rate designs294 including:
(1) performance-based ratemaking;295 (2) incentive rates;296 (3) alternative
regulation;297 (4) market-based rates; (5) decoupling;298 (6) feed-in-tariffs;299
290.
See MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3. This tendency to invest
and expand is also known as the A-J effect or the Averch-Johnson effect, based upon the
seminal paper by Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson. Harvey Averch & Leland L.
Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052
(1962).
291.
MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3.
292.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 1.
293.
Burr, supra note 9, at 30.
294.
See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 174–79.
295.
See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SCHMIDT, PERFORMANCE-BASED RATEMAKING:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (2000).
296.
See, e.g., Scott H. Strauss & Jeffrey A. Schwarz, Transmission Incentive
Overhaul: FERC’s ROE Incentive Adder Policy Sends the Wrong Signals, 147 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. Feb. 2009, at 32, 33.
297.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 1 (a
report for the Edison Electric Institute).
298.
THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND
DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 1–2 (2011), available at http://
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and, (7) results-based regulation as examples.300 In choosing among new
rate designs, regulators must “address the fact that in an efficient, modern
utility, conventional revenue recovery may no longer keep pace with utility
system costs, investment needs, and the changing dynamics of customers
which have a growing range of energy related choices ranging from DG to
demand response.”301 Further, rates should be seen as “a means by which
energy companies communicate their value proposition to their customers—
[and] not merely the process by which they collect revenues.”302 Thus, while
a wide variety of approaches can be adapted for a new electricity market, any
choice should be based upon a set of principles.
A.

Costs

While costs will most likely play some role in any new rate
design,303 the move away from using historically embedded costs—or even
future tests year costs—as the central element of utilities revenue
requirement must be changed. A key move away from cost-based
ratemaking is decoupling. At its simplest form, decoupling means that rates
will not be based on the volume of electricity sales; instead, rates will be
based on other indicators such as the number of customers served.304
Another basic element of decoupling is that it allows for periodic rate
adjustments.305 Still, there are a variety of decoupling mechanisms.306
“Some mechanisms use the revenue authorized in the utility’s last general
rate case; others adjust that for specific cost changes or according to a

www.raponline.org/document/download/id/861; see also LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP.
RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 15–16.
299.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging
Deployment of Renewable Electricity Technologies (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471.
300.
MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 3.
301.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 14.
302.
Philip Q. Hanser, Rate Design by Objective: A Purposeful Approach to
Setting Energy Prices, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 2012, at 48, 50.
303.
MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 14.
304.
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 298, at 2.
305.
PAMELA MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., A DECADE OF DECOUPLING FOR
US ENERGY UTILITIES: RATE IMPACTS, DESIGNS, AND OBSERVATIONS 6 (rev. ed. 2013),
available at http://www.switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/rcavanagh/decouplingreportMorganfinal
.pdf; see, e.g., Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Pat Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council,
EEI/NRDC Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp.
306.
MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., supra note 305, at 5.
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formula, and still others calculate revenue on a per-customer account basis
rather than as a single dollar amount.”307
B.

Innovation and Transition

Rate designs can promote innovation and assist in the clean energy
transition by allowing utilities to recover investments in innovation, energy
efficiency, or renewable resources.308 Smart grid investments should be
recouped, for example.309 Similarly, investments in smart meters, energy
savings appliances, energy audits, and the like should be encouraged and
included in any utilities revenue requirement. Regulators, of course, will
have a great degree of discretion. Some investments can be included in rate
base, and therefore can earn a return for shareholders. Other investments can
be treated as costs and recouped dollar-for-dollar.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the utility regulator has
adopted a Revenue set to deliver strong Incentives, Innovation, and Outputs
(“RIIO”) rate design.310 The intent is to have “utilities . . . focus on
delivering long-term value to customers.”311 “Revenues [will be] set based
[up]on a review of the utility’s business plan,” including planned operating
expenses as well as an assessment of future capital investment.312 The rates
are then set on a multi-year basis and are intended to “provide[] an incentive
for the utility to pursue efficiency improvements by [allowing a] utility . . . to
retain [some] of [the] cost savings.”313 Indeed, cost sharing is a principal that
should incentivize utilities to earn savings that can then be shared with
customers.314 Again, regulators will have discretion on the proportion of cost
sharing between the parties, but the idea is to create incentives for innovation
and efficiency.315
In the same way that revenue decoupling and shared savings
policies together can provide strong incentives for utilities to
invest in energy efficiency, a similar approach could strengthen
incentives for utilities to invest in distributed generation, storage,
microgrids, smart electric vehicle charging, smart inverters, or
other distributed technologies to reduce operating costs and/or [to]
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
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defer or avoid the need for investments to expand capacity of
distribution feeders or invest[ed] in . . . other electricity supply,
transmission, or distribution assets.316

A smart rate design, then, may require hybrid pricing models that
apply to different investments and to different expenses. Electricity rates can
be unbundled for different purposes such as “unbundled pricing for
reliability, standby, and power quality services; temporally or locationally
differentiated prices for energy or distribution services; price structures that
reflect how costs are incurred—e.g. fixed, demand-based, energy-based,
etc.—and incentive payments for dispatchable demand response or ancillary
services to the grid.”317
Smart rate designs, then, “may ultimately create a nimble system that
pays for required services, maximizes value, and allows for effective
implementation.”318 The core idea behind moving away from cost-based
ratemaking to rate designs that are more sensitive to the market and
technological developments is to encourage competition and enable utilities
to capitalize on new opportunities.319
C.

Balance of Interests

Shareholders, of course, will only invest if they earn a reasonable
return on their investment. That return must be comparable with investments
of similar risk. Nevertheless, shareholders do take on some investment risk
and they should not be guaranteed a return at the expense of customers who
may receive little or no benefit.320 The trick, of course, is in clearly
identifying the risks to shareholders, as well as the costs and benefits to
consumers. Rates should send clear price signals that account for both fixed
and variable costs,321 avoid cross-subsidization as much as possible,322 and
represent the value of services provided to the customer by the utility.323
“Building a shared understanding among stakeholders and regulators in the
electricity sector about the full range of costs and benefits of distributed
energy resources and the implications of net energy metering is an essential

316.
317.
318.
319.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 46.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 14.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 43.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 13–

320.
321.
322.
323.

MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 11.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 10.
See id.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 41.
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first step toward devising rates and incentives that will create the greatest
benefit for all.”324
D.

Prudence and Needs Reviews

Prudence reviews became a matter of concern to utilities with the
collapse of the nuclear power industry. The possibility of a prudence review
constitutes a risk to investors; however, all risk cannot and should not be
eliminated.325 The fact that utility’s capital investment will be reviewed for
prudence should be considered simply a matter of bringing business
discipline into the electricity market. A prudence review should work handin-hand with the obligation of a utility to mitigate the costs of unwise
investments.
Generally, a prudence review occurs at the time a utility wants to
include specific investments in the rate base as part of a rate hearing.326 The
problem with ex post reviews of investment decisions should be apparent.
At Time One—for example—a utility assesses the need for a capital
investment.327 Construction projects—particularly nuclear plants—take
years and up to a decade or more to complete. Consequently, the decision to
include that investment in the rate base will occur at a time when future
market and financial conditions, as well as the need for energy, can change
significantly. One way of reducing the risk of a disallowance at Time Two
when the prudence review takes place is for regulators to aggressively assess
the need for power before the investment is made.328 These two sets of
principles, both for the regulatory compact and for new rate designs, are
intended to encourage IOUs to reshape the way they do business.329
VIII.

NEW UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL

One need only look at the technological advances in telephony and
computers to realize that the world is changed in ways that will not return.
Landlines and desktop computers have largely become things of the past.
Electricity providers are proliferating, energy efficient appliances and
324.
Id. at 36.
325.
See Rilck Noel, Managing Risk: Prudence Reviews and Nuclear Projects,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 2006, at 21, 23.
326.
See id. at 21.
327.
See id. at 22–23.
328.
See Util. Reform Network v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747,
762–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); N. States Power Co., MPUC Docket No. E-002/CN-12-1240
(Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 31, 2013) (PUC reviewed need and setting conditions
regarding how that need can be satisfied); see also Noel, supra note 325, at 22–23.
329.
Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29.
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buildings are reducing per capita use, and competition and consumer choices
for power providers are increasing. IOUs, whether they like it or not, are in a
new market. Indeed, electric utilities should take a lesson from the
telecommunications playbook and invest in change rather than continue to
resist it.330
The renegotiated regulatory compact, together with innovative rate
designs, can encourage utilities to change the way they do business. More
specifically, IOUs whose primary or exclusive business is to increase
electricity sales cannot stay complacent in today’s changing market. Instead,
utilities must offer a wider array of energy products and services, running
from renewable energy and energy efficiency, to performing energy audits
for its customers and broadening the array of power providers.331 In
particular, utilities must act “more aggressively [by] looking at programs to
use distributed assets to their benefit so that they can have a wider
distribution of generation assets throughout their service areas.”332 By way
of example, NRG Energy333 and NextEra Energy334 are developing utilityscale solar and other renewable projects; firms like Direct Energy335 and
Veridian336 have partnered with Solar City to offer solar installations to their
customers; and Duke Energy and PSE&G have been “invest[ing] in
residential solar, microgrids, energy storage and smart grid technologies.”337
Indeed, opportunities abound for forward thinking utilities such as San Diego
Gas & Electric, which has proposed a strategy to engage in three energy
services functions: (1) generate and sell electricity to serve customers’ realtime needs; (2) provide distribution services; and (3) help customers manage
330.
See KIND, supra note 4, at 14–17.
331.
See Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 28; Tomain, “Steel in
the Ground,” supra note 246, at 931–933; see also Joint Statement from Edison Elec. Inst. &
Natural Res. Def. Counsel, supra note 305.
332.
Grid: Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility
Business Model (E&ETV Special Report television broadcast Jan. 28, 2014), available at
www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1771/transcript.
333.
Press Release, NRG Energy, Inc., World’s Largest Solar Thermal Power
Project at Ivanpah Achieves Commercial Operation (Feb. 13, 2014), phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=121544&p=irol-newsArticleNRG&ID=1899656.
334.
See Our Company, NEXTERA ENERGY, http://www.nexteraenergy.com/
company/our_company.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
335.
Eric Wesoff, SolarCity and Direct Energy Form $124M Fund for
(Sept.
10,
2013),
Commercial
and
Industrial
Solar,
GREENTECHSOLAR
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/SolarCity-And-Direct-Energy-Form-124MFund-For-Commercial-and-Industrial-S.
336.
Press Release, Solar City, SolarCity and Viridian Team to Provide Clean
Energy Day and Night (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.solarcity.com/pressreleases/204/solarcity-and-viridian-team-to-provide-clean-energy-day-and-night.aspx.
337.
Martin LaMonica, Inside the Utility-Renewables Power Play,
GREENBIZ.COM (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/print/55347.
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electricity use through programs that promote efficiency, smart appliances
and meters, electric vehicle charging, and the like.338
Traditionally structured, vertically integrated electric utilities served
the country well for most of the twentieth century as demand continued to
grow. Now with flattening demand, together with the need for investments
in grid improvement, smart grid technologies, access to the grid by variable
resources, reliability, cyber security, and pushes for greater use of renewable
resources and energy efficiency, the utility of the future must acknowledge
that the integrated utility model will not function effectively in a DG
world.339 In short, as former Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) Chair Jon Wellinghoff has stated, “utilities are going to have to
have the ability to morph into those roles of entrepreneurs and marketers and
deliverers of these energy services to be able to effectively compete with all
the other people in the space.”340 Further, today’s electric utilities must also
recognize that the new market “does present new avenues for investment and
growth in terms of grid expansion, smart grid, storage, and downstream
services; the question is whether utilities grasp that opportunity and evolve
themselves.”341
One way of conceptualizing the new utility model is to focus on
distribution and customer service rather than on generation where the
utility’s primary business is to serve as a grid operator in an environment of
wholesale and retail competition.342 Innovative utilities are sensitive to
customer demand.343 Studies show, for example, that consumers are
responding to price information and that they are reducing consumption at
peak times.344 Some of this consumer price responsiveness is due to pilot
programs such as those in California, which are being operated by San Diego
Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison that provide rebates to
customers for electricity saved in particular peak event days.345 In addition,
338.
339.

SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 23.
See CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73; ELEC. INNOVATION LAB,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 13–14.
340.
Grid: Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility
Business Model, supra note 332.
341.
CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73.
342.
See generally Bain & Co., California Public Utilities Commission: The
Business Model for the Electric Utility of the Future, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Oct. 8,
2013), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/932AC939-CAC7-43E3-BF06-61D5E90FCC25
/0/1ScaliseCPUCenbanc1082013.pdf.
343.
Paul Woods, The Social Utility: Mastering Multi-Channel
Communications for Customer Service Success, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2012, at 40, 41–42;
see also Bain & Co., supra note 342.
344.
See, e.g., Faruqui & Shultz, supra note 56, at 24–25.
345.
Id. at 24.
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behind-the-meter technologies such as home displays, programmable
thermostats and other appliances, along with simple social networking, all
provide information about how consumers can increase their energy
efficiency to help IOUs develop their business plans.346
Thus, the utility of the future must start with the recognition that
their primary business is not selling a commodity; it is providing and
managing an infrastructure service.347
The entrepreneurs who put that competitive solar power on your
roof with no money down can provide a portfolio of other equally
unregulated products, like efficiency, demand response, storage,
and so on, that could ultimately add up to a virtual utility providing
the same services that utilities now provide—quite possibly with
lower cost and greater reliability and resilience.348

Another, similar, way of conceptualizing the utility of the future is to
see it as a network entity.
Under a network utility approach, the utility would
provide highly differentiated price signals to direct investments by
other service providers. In this case, the utility’s role would
increasingly be focused on maintaining and operating the grid and
on creating markets, managing transactions, replacing aging
distribution equipment, and/or making smart grid investments and
interconnecting buyers and sellers with the network. This network
utility would shepherd and coordinate the network of increasingly
complex transactions among [a] growing number of actors.349

Such a utility would: (1) pick a distribution area where a utility plans to
expand, upgrade or modernize; (2) assess peak load demand; (3) use demand
side management to target reducing loads; and (4) expand DG rather than
add transportation and distribution.
Such new business approaches should be responsive to any number
of issues. If large capital investments are too financially risky, then they can
be scaled down. If investments in efficiency and in DG are less costly and
less risky than building a new plant or making significant additions to T&D,
then those investments should be made. Similarly, if the concern with
upgrading and modernizing the grid is cyber security, then reducing the scale
346.
See, e.g., Woods, supra note 343, at 41–42 (arguing that utilities are
underutilizing social networks to inform their customers about energy consumption).
347.
Burr, supra note 9, at 31 (referencing a comment by Walt Patterson).
348.
Id. (quoting Amory Lovins).
349.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
47.
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of generation and multiplying power sites rather than concentrating them will
reduce those risks. Also, if natural disasters threaten the grid,350 then DG,
microgrids,351 and the like may well prove to be smart alternatives.
The utility of the future, then, will adopt a new vision of the
electricity business. The new utility will see itself not as a isolated actor in
the market, but as part of a network “that provides a platform for the
economic and operational integration of distributed resources.”352 The new
utility will use more transparent costs and benefits of service, including
technical standards, such as those needed for interconnection, as well as
economic standards, such as those used in making value determinations and
pricing goods and services generally.353 The new utility will be a value
creator by serving as: (1) a distributed system operator;354 (2) an integrated
resource planner for both large-scale distributed energy resources, and
storage; (3) a provider of reliability and standby power to customers; and (4)
an energy services provider and financier, through rates, of such things as
energy efficiency retrofits, energy control systems, DG, storage, and the
like.355
As new technologies and new strategies develop, the utility of the
future must integrate them into its portfolio and into its rate designs.
Strategic investments as well as strategic partnerships will be necessary
components of utilities’ new business model. Investments in distributed
generation such as fuel cells356 or rooftop solar—as examples—can in some
350.
See, e.g., Robert Uluski, Modernization Foundation: Near-Term Vision
for Advanced Distribution Management, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2014, at 44, 45 (“Recent socalled ‘storm of the century’ events in the Northeast [United States] and the lengthy power
outages and customer hardships that followed have greatly elevated the need to make power
delivery systems more resilient to major storm events and to provide a more effective electric
utility response during such regional power grid emergencies.”).
351.
See Sara C. Bronin & Paul R. McCary, Peaceful Coexistence:
Independent Microgrids Are Coming. Will Franchised Utilities Fight Them or Foster Them?,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2013, at 38, 39. “Generally speaking, a microgrid is a small-scale,
low-voltage system for sharing distributed generation among several facilities or end users.”
Id. Microgrids can be powered by conventional fuels, fuel cells, solar panels or wind turbines.
Id. They may also incorporate combined heat and power. Id.
352.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 9.
353.
Id.
354.
See, e.g., Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 19.
355.
See id. at 16–20.
356.
Anthony Leo, FuelCell Energy, Stationary Fuel Cell Power Systems with
Direct FuelCell Technology Tackle Growing Distributed Baseload Power Challenge,
DOMINION,
https://www.dom.com/about/stations/fossil/pdf/fuelcell-whitepaper.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 30, 2014). As defined by the vendor, FuelCell Energy,
fuel cells are electrochemical devices that combine fuel with oxygen from the
ambient air to produce electricity and heat, as well as water. The non-combustion,
electrochemical process is a direct form of fuel-to-energy conversion, and is much
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instances produce greater efficiency, and in both instances reduce carbon
emissions.357 Companies such as Bloomenergy358 and FuelCell Energy359 are
actively in the market constructing fuel cells on-site as well as developing
them for traditional IOUs and these are partnership opportunities.360 Fuel
cells can achieve greater efficiencies and, as their costs decline, they become
cost competitive in the current electricity market.361 Similarly, rooftop solar
offers a low carbon alternative to baseload power and it is being offered by
such companies such as Solar City that finance, install, and maintain the
systems at a lower cost to the owner than traditional utility service under
long-term power purchase agreements.362
This type of financial
intermediation could also be adopted by the traditional IOU.363
IX.

CONCLUSION

Thus, to succeed in the new electricity market, IOUs should adopt
leadership roles by: (1) developing a plan for technological deployment and
including DG;364 (2) engaging in strategic investments in fuel cells and in
rooftop solar; (3) providing financial assistance to customers who wish to
invest in alternative technologies and in energy efficiency; (4) assisting
regulators in designing new rate structures; and (5) partnering with other
vendors, utilities, and a variety of investors to engage all of these, and other,
innovative and creative activities.365
As such, the new utility will be proactively responding to a new
business environment. Utilities, however, cannot and will not act on their
more efficient than conventional heat engine approaches. CO2 is reduced, due to
the high efficiency of the fuel cell, and the absence of combustion avoids the
production of NOx and particulate pollutants.

Id.
357.
358.

See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17.
BLOOMENERGY, http://www.bloomenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30,

359.

FUELCELL ENERGY, http://www.fuelcellenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30,

2014).
2014).
360.
See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 18, 20; Scott Hempling,
Protecting Innovation During Consolidation:
The Advantages of Alertness,
SCOTTHEMPLINGLAW.COM (Feb. 2014), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/essays/protectinginnovation.
361.
See, e.g., Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17–18.
362.
Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://www.solarcity.com/
residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); see also SUNGEVITY, http://www.sungevity.com (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).
363.
Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17.
364.
See, e.g., Jolly et al., supra note 215, at 35.
365.
Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 20; see also CHANNELL ET AL.,
supra note 50, at 77.
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own. They must be aided and abetted by regulators who adopt new rules for
their relationship with utilities that they regulate. Those new rules will be
sensitive to the new market, sensitive to the demands of customers, and
sensitive to the needs of utilities. The sensitivities are not only responsive to
changing market conditions, they are responsive to a fundamental change in
energy and electricity policy. The traditional fossil fuel policy is no longer
viable. The future demands a clean energy economy and smart IOUs can
play a transformative role. The clean energy future will increase their
reliance on renewable resources and energy efficiency, thus increasing the
diversity of inputs into electricity generation. In addition, the clean energy
future should encourage competition, consumer choice, and technological
innovation, as well as economic growth. Although the challenges are real,
the direction of the future should be clear. IOUs can, then, play a leading
role in building out the DG world.
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